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The EU Working Time Directive has so far had little impact on an ingrained 
culture of long-hours working in the UK.  Case studies suggest that the use of 
individual opt-outs from the 48-hour limit on weekly working time is a principal 
reason for this.  However, removal of the individual opt-out (currently under 
consideration at EU level) is unlikely to make much difference to UK practice 
in the absence of a wider review of working time policy.  In particular, the UK’s 
individualised system of workplace bargaining is currently ill-placed to adapt to 
a continental European model of working time regulation. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The United Kingdom has not had a history of centralized, legislative regulation 
of  working  time.  Working  hours  have  traditionally  been  set  by  collective 
agreements negotiated at sector or plant level.  With the adoption in 1998 of 
Regulations  implementing  the  EC  Working  Time  Directive,  a  significant 
cultural change seemed in prospect.  Working time legislation, according to the 
Fairness at Work White Paper, would lead both to a better work-life balance 
and to ‘more efficient working practices and innovation’.
1  At the same time, the 
Working Time Regulations 1998, reflecting the content of the Directive, made it 
possible for individual workers to make agreements with their employers to opt 
out of the 48 hour  limit  to  weekly  working hours.  This  provision –  Article 
18(1)(b)  of  the  Directive  –  potentially  has  a  limited  life  span:  it  must  be 
reconsidered by the Council seven years after the date on which the Directive 
came into force.  That seven-year period was due to expire on 23 November 
2003.
2   
 
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  consider  how  Article  18(1)(b)  has  operated  in 
practice in the United Kingdom. We present findings from a more extensive 
analysis that was carried out for the European Commission during 2002-3, as 
part of the process leading to the Council’s review of Article 18(1)(b) in 2003.  
Our evidence takes the form of enterprise level case studies that were chosen to 
illustrate  the  range  of  possible  responses  to  the  individual  opt-out  across 
different  sectors  and  types  of  organisation  (public  and  private  sector; 
manufacturing and services; larger and smaller sized enterprises).   
 
We find that the individual opt-out is in widespread use and is regarded, in 
preference  to  other  derogations,  as  the  most  convenient  and  effective 
mechanism for avoiding the 48-hour limit on weekly working time.  In part 
because of the ease with which this limit can be avoided, the Directive has so 
far done little to change a long-hours culture, driven by employers’ perceived 
needs for flexibility and workers’ desire to supplement their earnings or status.  
While we also find evidence of innovation in working time in some workplaces, 
in  the  form  of  a  move  towards  the  annualisation  of  hours  coupled  with  an 
overall reduction in hours worked, this cannot be solely or even principally 
attributed to the Directive.   
 
The presentation is as follows. Section 2 lays out the relevant legal background, 
section 3 describes the industrial relations context, and section 4 presents the 
empirical findings. Section 5 offers an assessment of the evidence that discusses 
arguments for and against retaining the opt-out.  Section 6 concludes. 
   2
2.  The Legal Background 
 
Regulation 4(1) of the 1998 Working Time Regulations (henceforth ‘WTR’) 
replicated Article 6 of the Directive, and provided that a worker’s working time, 
including overtime, should not exceed an average of 48 hours for each seven 
days  over  a  basic  reference  period  of  17  weeks.
3  In  addition,  the  UK  took 
advantage of the individual opt-out permitted by Article 18(1)(b), which allowed 
workers to agree with their employers that the 48-hour ceiling did not apply to 
them.  The 1998 Regulations laid down detailed record keeping rules but business 
complained that this ‘gold-plated’ the Directive.  As a result of amendments made 
to the Working Time Regulations in 1999
4 the record keeping requirements were 
significantly  watered  down.  Regulation  4(1)  now  provides  that  ‘[u]nless  his 
employer has first obtained the worker’s agreement in writing to perform such 
work  a  worker’s  working  time,  including  overtime,  in  any  reference  period 
which is applicable in his case shall not exceed an average of 48 hours for each 
seven days’.  Regulation 4(2) simply requires the employer to ‘keep up-to-date 
records of all workers who carry out work to which it does not apply by reason 
of the fact that the employer has obtained the worker’s agreement as mentioned 
in paragraph (1)’.   
 
A number of other derogations are provided for in both the Directive and the 
Regulations.  The most important of these relates to what the Regulations call 
‘unmeasured working time’. Regulation 20 of the 1998 legislation stated that 
the 48-hour weekly limit (among other things) did not apply to ‘a worker where, 
on account of the specific characteristics of the activity in which he is engaged, 
the duration of his working time is not measured or predetermined or can be 
determined by the worker himself, as may be the case for:  
 
(a)  managing executives or other persons with autonomous decision-taking 
powers;  
 
(b) family workers; or 
 
(c)  workers  officiating  at  religious  ceremonies  in  churches  and  religious 
communities’.  
 
The scope of this provision was highly uncertain.
5  In particular, it was unclear 
whether the derogation applied to  many  categories of individuals, especially 
junior professionals who might have certain tasks to fulfil but who combined 
this with a high degree of autonomy.
6  To help address this question, the 1999 
Regulations added a new paragraph (2) to regulation 20 which had the effect of   3
broadening the range of workers (and work) to which the derogation applied.  
Regulation 20(2) now provides: 
 
Where  part  of  the  working  time  of  a  worker  is  measured  or 
predetermined or cannot be determined by the worker himself but 
the  specific  characteristics  of  the  activity  are  such  that,  without 
being required to do so by the employer, the worker may also do 
work the duration of which is not measured or predetermined or can 
be determined by the worker himself, regulations 4(1) and (2) and 
6(1),  (2)  and  (7)  shall  apply  only  to  so  much  of  his  work  as  is 
measured or predetermined or cannot be determined by the worker 
himself (emphasis added). 
 
Regulation 20(2) is therefore intended to deal with workers whose working time 
is partly measured, predetermined or determined by the worker and partly not.  
The 48-hour limit applies only to the work that is predetermined or measured.  
In respect of the part of the job that is not predetermined, the 48-hour limit does 
not apply.  
 
Regulation 23, the other derogation that is of relevance to working time, concerns 
collective agreements and workforce agreements.  Using ‘collective agreements 
and agreements between the two sides of industry at national or regional level’, as 
envisaged by the Directive, to implement, derogate or negotiate working time 
limits, presented particular difficulties in translating the Directive into UK law.  
Legislation dating from the 1970s has favoured the recognized trade union as the 
‘single  channel’  to  worker  representation.  However,  in  Case  C-383/92 
Commission  v.  UK 
7  the  Court  ruled  that  the  UK  had  failed  to  fulfil  its 
obligations  under  Articles  2 and  3  of  Directive  75/129/EEC  (now  Directive 
98/59/EC) on collective redundancies by not providing a mechanism for the 
designation of workers’ representatives in an undertaking where the employer 
refused to recognise a trade union.  At this point, over half the British workforce 
worked  in  workplaces  where  trade  unions  were  not  recognised.  The  ECJ’s 
ruling eventually led to the emergence of modified form of the single channel, 
where worker representation is primarily conducted by recognised trade union 
but,  in  the  absence  of  such  representation,  workers  can  be  represented  by 
elected  representatives  who  negotiate  a  ‘workforce  agreement’.
8  This  is  the 
approach  adopted  in  the  Working  Time  Regulations.  Most  importantly  for 
current purposes, under regulation 23 a collective or workforce agreement can 
be used to vary the ‘reference period’ over which the 48-hour week can be 
averaged from the default period of 17 weeks to up to 52 weeks for objective or 
technical reasons concerning the organisation of work. 
   4
3.  The Industrial Relations Context 
 
3.1  The legacy of partial regulation 
 
As we noted above, until recently the regulation of working time in the United 
Kingdom  depended  on  collective  bargaining  rather  than  legislation.  The 
Factories Acts of the nineteenth century, despite their historical importance in 
the history of labour law as one of the first attempts of a legislature to regulate 
industrial employment, did not bequeath a viable model to modern employment 
relations. The controls which these Acts laid down, dating from the 1840s, were 
confined to regulating the terms and conditions of women and young children in 
factories  and  workshops.  From  the  1870s  onwards,  statutory  regulation 
increasingly gave way to voluntary collective bargaining between employers 
and  trade  unions  as  the  principal  mechanism  for  regulating  working  time.  
Although some unions campaigned for a statutory eight-hour day, this won the 
support of a minority only of the Royal Commission on Labour of 1892-4.   
 
Subsequently  the  main  instrument  of  regulation  was  the  sector-level  or 
multi-employer collective agreement, covering employers in a given industry or 
trade. The state intervened directly through legislation only in those sectors of 
the  economy  where  collective  bargaining  had  failed  to  develop  of  its  own 
accord (mainly the sectors in which there were trade boards or wages councils).  
Indirect government encouragement was given for voluntary arrangements for 
multi-employer  bargaining  at  industry  or  sector  level,  and  these  forms 
(collectively known as the ‘Joint Industrial Council’ model) became widespread 
in British industry during the inter-war period. In the 1920s, a basic 48-hour 
week was established in the engineering industry by collective bargaining, and 
from  this  point  on  the  national  engineering  agreement  set  a  benchmark  for 
industry-level  practice.  The  national  engineering  agreement  brought  about 
reductions in the basic working week to 44 hours in 1927, 42 hours in 1960, 40 
hours in 1965 and 39 hours in 1979.  Other sectors tended to follow engineering 
in reducing working hours after a gap of a few years. However, even at its 
height  in  the  immediate  post-1945  period,  the  system  of  sectoral  collective 
bargaining  was  more  concerned  with  ensuring  premium  rates  of  pay  for 
overtime and unsocial hours working, than with restricting working hours as 
such.  During  the  1980s,  what  little  legislation  there  was  on  the  subject  of 
working time was repealed, at the same time as sectoral collective agreements 
were also on the decline. This process reflected the then policy of ‘lifting the 
burden’ of regulation in the labour market.
9   
 
At the start of the 1990s, a Department of Employment study found that only 
10% of all employees in the UK normally worked precisely 40 hours per week,   5
in contrast to 34% of employees in the rest of the European Community. Over 
72% of employees in the other (then) eleven member states worked between 35 
and 40 hours per week, compared to 36% in the UK.
10  Both overtime and shift 
working, although they tended to fluctuate with the economic cycle, were in 
widespread use. Figures from 1988, when overtime working was at historically 
high levels, showed that over 41% of British male workers were employed for 
46 hours  or  more per  week,  compared  to  a  figure of  23%  for the  EC as a 
whole.
11 Studies from this period found some sectors in which hours worked 
were  extremely  long,  regardless  of  cyclical  factors.  Railway  workers,  lorry 
drivers and merchant seamen had a working week of around 50 hours or more.   
In the absence of a legal basic working week, and with the decline in collective 
bargaining coverage, it was possible for employers in certain sectors to avoid 
paying  overtime  altogether.  This  was  the  case  in  security  work,  where  low 




3.2  The initial impact of the Working Time Directive 
 
A number of more recent studies have updated the picture presented by the 
research of the early 1990s. The message from these studies is that while the 
new legislation has had some impact in terms of reducing working hours and 
stimulating changes to working practices, the familiar features of the system 
remain largely intact. A TUC study from February 2002, based on analysis of 
the  government’s  Labour  Force  Survey  and  a  TUC-commissioned  survey, 
reported that nearly 4 million persons or 16% of the labour force were working 
over 48 hours per week compared to 3.3 million (then 15%) in the early 1990s, 
and that the numbers working over 55 hours per week had risen to 1.5 million.  
The  average  working  week  for  the  UK  was  43.6  hours,  compared  to  an 
EU-wide average of 40.3 hours.  Long hours were particularly prevalent among 
managerial and professional workers of both sexes, and among male workers in 
more highly skilled jobs in manufacturing, construction and transport. The main 
reason  given  by  managers  and  professionals  for  working  long  hours  was 
excessive  workloads,  while  for  manual  workers  it  was  the  need  to  enhance 
earnings through overtime.
13   
 
A DTI research note
14 reported in July 2002 that 16% of all employees and 22% 
of full-time employees were working over 48 hours per week in the spring of 
2001. Three quarters of those working such long hours were men. Almost 9% of 
full-time employees were working over 48 hours per week without receiving 
overtime.  This  note  also  reported  that  long-hours  working  in  excess  of  the 
48-hour figure differed substantially across occupational groups. The highest 
proportions of employees working in excess of 48 hours per week were found in   6
‘managers and senior officials’ (37%), ‘professional occupations’ (30%) and 
‘process,  plant  and  machine  operatives’  (28%).      By  industry,  the  sectors 
reporting the highest numbers of workers working for more than 48 hours per 
week  were  ‘agriculture  and  fishing’,  ‘transport  and  communication’, 
‘construction’ and ‘energy and water’, which were all in excess of 25%.
15 
 
This DTI research also reported on the impact of the WTR 1998. The proportion 
of employees reporting that they regularly worked for more than 48 hours per 
week fell slightly in 1998, and this small reduction was repeated in 1999, 2000 
and 2001. Prior to this, the numbers reporting hours over 48 per week had risen 
consistently since the early 1980s. The fall in hours after 1999 was driven by a 
reduction in the hours of male workers. The DTI note attempted to estimate one 
of  the  possible  effects  of  removing  the  individual  opt-out  from  the  48-hour 
week, by calculating the numbers employed for more than 48 hours a week over 
a period in excess of the default reference period of 17 weeks. Analysis of the 
Labour  Force  Survey  showed  that  16%  of  all  full-time  employees  or  three 
million individuals approximately usually worked more than 48 hours per week 
on two successive quarterly reporting points (three months), and 10%, or two 
million individuals, over five successive quarters (twelve months). On this basis 
it was concluded that ‘approximately three million people would be affected by 
a removal of the [individual] opt-out in the UK (because they said that they 
usually worked for over 48 hours on two successive quarters, when they were 
interviewed)’. While a segment of this group could benefit from collective or 
workforce agreements with lengthened the normal 17-week reference period, 
the note concluded that this would not help the 2 million working in excess of 
48 hours per week on a year-round basis. However, the note did not consider 
that  a  certain  proportion  of  this  group  might  fall  under  the  derogation  for 
‘unmeasured working time’.   
 
Case study evidence on employers’ responses to the WTR is provided by Fiona 
Neathey and James Arrowsmith’s 2001 study, carried out for the DTI.
16 This 
research was based on a non-random sample of 20 employers, selected to reflect 
a  variety  of  different  types  of  organisations.  Around  a  third  of  the  sample 
reported that, as a result of the implementation of the Regulations, working 
practices had been reviewed with the aim of putting in place a ‘work smarter’ 
strategy.  Shorter  working  hours  and/or  the  reduction  of  operating  time  to  a 
reduced number of working days had led to greater flexibility of employment 
and, in some cases, improved operational efficiency and customer satisfaction.  
Half of the sample reported that the Regulations had had little or no impact on 
them: these tended to be smaller establishments, those making use of individual 
opt-outs  and/or  derogations  established  through  collective  agreements  or   7
workforce agreements, and those with working practices which were already in 
line with the Regulations.   
 
The study found that management had been proactive in implementing the new 
standards, and that while there was evidence that collective agreements (in five 
case) and workforce agreements (in three cases) had been used to implement 
derogations and flexible working arrangements, the principal form of employee 
involvement was consultation rather than negotiation. The individual opt-out 
was the most common response to the need to provide for working in excess of 
the 48-hour week, but collective and workforce agreements were also used to 
change reference periods. A number of sample employers had also achieved 
compliance with the 48-hour week by changing working practices, increasing 
staffing levels, and revising shift arrangements. 
 
Neathey and Arrowsmith’s case studies were supplemented by evidence from 
the Warwick Pay and Working Time Survey.
17 This is based on a sample of 
around 300 employers in four sectors (printing, engineering, health, and retail).  
The WTR was reported to be a significant factor in changing working time 
practice, in particular in health, printing and retail, but to a lesser degree in 
engineering. Around half of printing and engineering employers, three out of 
five  NHS  trusts  and  virtually  all  the  retail  employers  had  either  made  or 
proposed a collective or workforce agreement in order to derogate from aspects 
of the WTR. Unions were involved in changes in all but one of the relevant 
NHS trusts, half of the print employers, and two thirds of the engineering and 
retail employers. Two thirds of engineering employers reported making use of 
individual opt-outs, along with half of the sample in each of the other three 
sectors. 
 
The  Warwick  Pay  and  Working  Time  Survey  evidence  suggested  that 
‘managers  expect  the  substantive  terms  of  the  WTR  to  have  important 
implications in the future’ and that the Regulations’ procedural effects were also 
significant: ‘[b]y lending statutory support to the principle of consultation and 
negotiation over hours of work, the Regulations help to clearly and more widely 
establish  working  time  arrangements  as  a  primary  concern  of  workplace 
industrial relations’.
18 At the same time, Neathey and Arrowsmith
19 interpreted 
their case studies as showing that ‘only in organizations which decided to use 
the WTR as the basis for a review of, and change to, existing working time 
practices, have the Regulations had any significant impact on the organization 
of working time’, and in these organizations ‘the absence of external pressure 
meant that the initial impetus for change diminished in the 18 months after 
implementation of the Regulations’.  
   8
A follow-up study published in 2003
20 reported little further change in most 
organizations.  However,  one  company  (in  the  printing  sector)  that  had 
previously  used  individual  opt-outs  had  dispensed  with  them,  replacing 
long-hours  working  with  a  new,  permanent  night  shift.  In  another  case,  a 
contracting  company  had  succeeded  in  reducing  the  hours  of  most  of  its 
employees to below the 48-hour average over a 52-week reference period, and 
saw the WTR as ‘helping the company to change working practices which in 
some  areas  were  threatening  the  health  of  employees’.
21  This  study  also 
reported  concern  on  the  part  of  some  employers  at  the  possibility  that  the 




4.  The Empirical Study 
 
4.1  Methodology  
 
Our empirical study focused specifically on the use of the individual opt-out 
and of the other derogations permitted by legislation. A total of forty interviews 
were conducted in the period August-November 2002. We concentrated on five 
sectors where it was believed that working time often exceeded the average 
48-hour limit, so that the individual opt-out would be a pertinent issue. These 
were Education, Health, Manufacturing and Engineering, Financial and Legal 
Services, and Hotel and Catering. Interviews were also carried out with twelve 
trade  union  officers,
23  the  TUC,  seven  employers’  organisations,
24  and  HR 
managers in thirteen case study employers. The sample of case studies is not 
statistically representative but was selected to reflect the different pressures and 
conditions operating on organisations and to provide a range of contexts in 
which individual opt-out agreements have been used. The sample was designed 
to ensure that organisations with small, medium and large workforces were 
included and to cover a mixture of unionised and non-unionised establishments. 
The aim was also to include organisations that had implemented collective and 
workforce agreements. In the end, no detailed case studies were undertaken in 
the Education sector because it was evident from the initial interviews with 
employer and employee representatives that the individual opt-out had been 
rarely used in this sector. Table 1 sets out the characteristics of the case study 
employers.  Here,  a  ‘unionised’  employer  is  one  which  recognised  an 
independent trade union for the purposes of collective bargaining for all or part 
of its workforce.   
 
In addition, interviews were conducted with a range of public officials with 
responsibility  for working time.  The officials represented the Department of 
Trade  and  Industry  (DTI);  Advisory  Conciliation  and  Arbitration  Service   9
(ACAS);  Health  and  Safety  Executive  (HSE);  and  a  Local  Government 
Environmental  Health  Department.  A  search  of  the  register  of  cases  at  the 
offices  of  the  Employment  Tribunal  Service  (ETS)  was  undertaken.  An 
employment  law  practitioner  with practical  experience  in  this  area  was  also 
interviewed.  
 
Table 1.  Characteristics of case study employers 
 
Name  Sector / Description  UK Staff  Unionised 
       
Health 
H1  Hospital Trust providing emergency and elective acute 
medical services 
6000  Yes 
H2  Hospital Trust providing emergency and elective acute 
medical services 
5000  Yes 
Manufacturing / Engineering 
ME1  A first tier manufacturer supplying components directly 
to the automotive industry 
148  Yes 
ME2  Manufacturer of high pressure aluminium die castings 
mainly for the automotive industry 
420  No 
ME3  Subsidiary of an international construction company 
specialising in foundation and underground engineering  
220  Yes 
ME4  Service engineers for supermarket commercial 
refrigeration equipment. Another (unionised) company 
in the same Group manufactures the equipment 
350  No 
ME5  Foreign-owned major manufacturer in the automotive 
industry 
3000  Yes 
ME6  Major food manufacturer with 18 operating companies  24000  Yes 
Financial and Legal 
FL1  Medium sized global private investment bank 
specialising in mergers and acquisitions 
550  No 
FL2  Large European owned Investment Bank  1500  No 
FL3  International law firm  1500  No 
Hotel and Catering 
HC1  International hotel and leisure company with four hotel 
brands and 2000 pubs and restaurants in UK  
45000  No 
HC2  Hotel company operating 62 hotels in UK. Subsidiary of 
major hotel, restaurant and leisure business 
10000  No 
 
In  the  following  sections  we  first  present  evidence  illustrating  how  widely 
individual opt-outs have been used. Secondly, we examine the business case for 
using opt-outs. We then address the use of opt-outs in the light of pragmatic and 
industrial  relations  considerations.  Finally  we  explore  the  process  by  which 
individual opt-outs are agreed between employers and their employees.  
 
   10
4.2  How widely are individual opt-out agreements used? 
  
As  there  is  no  requirement  to  register  agreements  with  any  public  or  other 
authority,  it  is  not  straightforward  to  determine  exactly  how  extensively 
individual opt-outs are being used. As we have seen, in 2002 the Labour Force 
Survey  reported  that  16%  of  full  time  employees,  approximately  3  million 
individuals, said that they usually worked for more than 48 hours per week on 
two successive quarterly reporting points. It cannot be assumed, however, that 
all of these individuals will necessarily have opted out because some may fall 
under  other  derogations,  such  as  that  for  ‘unmeasured  working  time’  in 
Regulation 20.  
 
In our sample, the use of the opt-out varied considerably according to sectoral 
conditions. Table 2 indicates how extensively opt-out agreements were used by 
the case-study organisations and the main business reasons given by each of the 
employers for making use of them. 
 






Use of  
Opt-outs 
Business Reasons for  










Applies to: consultants; 24/7 cover and 
shortages in specialist areas like operating 
theatres, medical imaging and pathology; 
bank nurses. Limit to 56 hours. 
H2  




10-15% of all 
staff 
Will apply opt-out where there are staff 
shortages, and to senior medical staff and 
bank nurses.  




37  85-90%   ‘Overtime culture’ previously existed with 
average of 25-30% overtime hours, weekly 
hours ranging 46-77. No one currently 
exceeds 48 hours. Demand has fallen, 








100%  Overtime provides flexibility in production. 
Only 5-6 operatives and maintenance 




  136 of 151 
hourly paid 
operatives 
Facilitates processes that, once started, must 
continue uninterrupted, such as concrete 
pours. Also enables company to meet client 
deadlines without incurring penalties. Site 
workers maximise earnings while away from 
home.   11




38  Almost all 
staff as a 
matter  
of course 
On call service engineers repairing 
supermarket refrigeration systems. 
Consistently work 70-80 hours per week, but 
not all booked time is spent actually 
working. Earnings £50-60,000 per annum.  
ME5 
(car manufacturer) 
39  <10%  Opt–outs only offered after management 
have reviewed other options such as 
reallocating and deleting work. Depends on 
annual sales cycle for cars and life cycle for 
new models.  
ME6 
(food manufacturer) 
39  95%  Fluctuating demand from retailers. Most 
subsidiaries do not exceed 48 hours. One 
ex-privately owned subsidiary has standard 
shift pattern of 57½ hours. Difficult to cut 
wages.  
Financial and Legal 
FL1 
(banking) 
  >90%  Need to complete merger and acquisition 





 9-6  
 7-5 
100%  60 hours norm expected of senior staff 
because of high volume of work, and 
importance of personalities to deals. Lower 
levels of staff claim overtime. 
FL3 
(law) 
35-37  Extensively  Supporting clients; personality-driven work; 
continuity of personnel; individuals’ 
understanding of deals. Income is generated 
from hourly fees. 
Hotel and Catering 
H1 









Almost entirely management and sales. 
Corporate managers need to travel across 









Team leaders and above, and seasonal 
associates. Some managers travel 
extensively across business units so 
flexibility required. Extra recruitment not 
really a solution. Monitoring would be a 
major issue. 
 
Neither the individual opt-out nor the 48-hour limit has been an issue in the 
education sector despite concerns over long hours working and workload. This 
is due in part to the statutory framework for schoolteachers’ pay and conditions.  
This  distinguishes  between  directed  and  non-directed  working  time,  thereby 
triggering the unmeasured working time derogation.
25 In higher education we 
were  told  that  the  WTR  has  had  limited  impact  because  of  ‘the  context  of 
professional  autonomy’  and  a  perception  that  academics  ‘do  not  necessarily 
want to be tied to a prescriptive set of terms and conditions’.
26   12
In the health sector the two case study employers in our sample used opt-outs 
for about 10-15% of the workforce, in areas where there was a need to maintain 
the  24-hour  service  but  there  were  particular  labour  shortages.  These  were 
radiologists, pathologists, anaesthetists, career grade doctors and some nurses.  
In hotel and catering opt-outs were rarely used for general staff.
27 However, for 
supervisory and managerial staff, about 10% of the total workforce, the take up 
of  opt-outs  was  almost  100%.  In  the  manufacturing  and  engineering  and 
financial and legal sectors, opt-outs were used far more extensively, covering 
about  90%  of  the  workforce  in  most  of  the  case  study  employers  in  these 
sectors.   
 
The evidence therefore suggests that there is quite extensive but varied use of 
individual opt-outs. This raises the question of why employers use individual 
opt-outs. 
 
4.3  The business case for using individual opt-outs 
 
Several employers argued that it was necessary to use opt-outs because limiting 
the  average  working  week  to  48  hours  would  impair  efficiency.  Several 
employers,  in  particular  in the  manufacturing  and  engineering  sector  and  in 
financial and legal services, argued that if the opt-out were not available, the 
costs of running their business would increase significantly as they would have 
to  recruit  more  labour  to  do  the  work.  Furthermore,  additional  recruitment 
would create practical problems and indirect costs, such as the need for extra 
plant and machinery or extra space in the office, staff restaurant or staff car 
park. The EEF relayed to us the opinion of a domestic appliance manufacturer 
that ‘the consumer will have to bear’ the ‘significant cost’ of complying with 
the  48-hour  limit,  which  ‘will  make  our  products  less  competitive  against 
foreign competition.’ Moreover, not all companies are able to pass on additional 
costs.  For  example,  one  of  the  small  engineering  companies  in  our  sample 
believed that they could ultimately be put out of business because they supplied 
a major motor manufacturer, and the terms of their contract dictated that there 
should be annual price decreases.  
 
Some employers made the slightly different argument that existing staff were 
trained and experienced, and that it would therefore be more efficient to utilise 
them  for  longer  hours  than  to  recruit  additional  staff.  Furthermore,  the 
investment banks and international law firm argued that it was necessary to 
develop very strong personal relationships so as to support the needs of very 
demanding clients. Their business was therefore ‘often personality driven, so 
you  really  want  the  same  person  doing  the  work’.
28  Moreover,  critical 
knowledge  of  issues  involved  in  particular  projects  was  often  stored  in  the   13
minds of individuals rather than being written down. So, additional recruitment 
and limiting individuals to 48 hours per week was not seen as a practical way 
forward.  
 
Some  employers  also  argued  that  individual  opt-outs  provided  operational 
flexibility that could not be satisfactorily compensated for even by averaging 
the 48-hour limit over a reference period as long as 52 weeks. For example, a 
subsidiary of the food manufacturer, a bakery, supplied supermarkets for which 
the volume of orders fluctuated by up to 50% on a daily basis. The company felt 
that the opt-out was necessary because it was not feasible to handle such wide 
daily fluctuations in demand through a formalised system of annualised hours. 
Similarly, the investment banks and the international law firm in our sample 
said that opt-outs were necessary because merger and acquisition deals required 
intense periods of working so as to complete documents and to finalise deals 
within very strict time scales. These firms felt that although it was possible to 
compensate for these intense working periods through informal systems of time 
off in lieu, it was not feasible to plan these periods into a formal annualised 
hours system. The CBI also argued that it is not always straightforward to move 
to annualised hours or other systems based on reference periods because ‘you 
have still got to do enormous amounts of monitoring and to know exactly what 
people are doing’. 
 
On the other hand, there was evidence supporting the claim that long hours 
working can lead to the inefficient utilisation of labour. For example, one of the 
small engineering companies said that on some occasions, when they had asked 
workers to do additional shifts and extra hours to meet demand, ‘the following 
week  half  of  them  go  sick.  So,  it  does  not  always  pay’.  Other  evidence 
illustrated how reducing working hours could improve efficiency. The Working 
Time  Officer  we  interviewed  told  us  of  one  firm  which  ‘had  done  a  cost 
exercise, got lots of additional staff in, cut down the overtime, and in the longer 
term  they  have  actually  saved  money  because  [they  do  not  have]  all  the 
overtime to pay for’.  
 
On this basis, several respondents on the trade union side argued that the use of 
individual opt-outs was disadvantageous for UK business because it meant that 
both employers and unions could avoid negotiating over the re-organisation of 
working patterns and so inefficient practices were perpetuated. According to the 
TUC,  ‘the  Working  Time  Regulations  have  [thus]  been  a  much  less  useful 
instrument to reduce working time and to go through this process of thinking 
about  pay,  hours  and  productivity  because  the  individual  opt-out  was 
implemented’.
29  
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Several union respondents pointed to the difficulty of voluntarily negotiating 
reductions in working hours without any legislative imperative to do so when 
the  consequence  would  be  lower  earnings  and  living  standards  for  their 
members. According to the TUC, this explained why work re-organisation has 
not been high on many union agendas. The difficulties from the employers’ 
perspective  were  best  illustrated  by  the  example  of  a  subsidiary  of  food 
manufacturer ME6. The HR Director accepted that a 57½ hour standard week 
(39  hours  basic  and  the  rest  paid  as  overtime)  was  unproductive  because 
workers were often tired. But, without any legislative imperative to implement 
change it was difficult for the company to ‘make people suddenly lose their 
hours  because  they  have  mortgages  based  on  this  level  of  income’.  The 
company  therefore  believed  removal  of  the  opt-out  and  imposition  of  the 
48-hour limit would be a useful lever in negotiations with unions. 
 
Furthermore,  the  CBI  acknowledged  that  ‘certain  companies  may  be  over 
reliant on the individual opt-out [in that] there are currently companies out there 
that have yet to begin that process of reorganising working [patterns] where it is 
warranted’. In addition, the TUC pointed to some examples where employers 
had been motivated to negotiate changes in the belief that the opt-out will be 
removed following the review of the Working Time Directive in 2003. One 
such case was a dairy company where 70 hours per week had been the norm 
because of the need to meet the requirements of supermarkets. However, the 
company had moved to annualised hours, had offered employees a range of 
shift patterns between 40 and 48 hours per week, and now produced the same 
amount  of  milk  more  efficiently.  The  TUC  argued  that  these  examples  of 
negotiating in the shadow of an anticipated change in the law illustrated how the 
availability of the opt-out was presently a barrier to innovation. 
 
However, there was also evidence indicating that use of the individual opt-out 
does  not  necessarily  preclude  innovation.  In  the  study  by  Neathey  and 
Arrowsmith, referred to above, three-quarters of the case studies were using 
individual opt-outs but twelve of the twenty organisations had seen changes in 
their  working  time  arrangements.  In  most  cases  changes  were  prompted  by 
competitive pressures to better meet customer needs.
30 In our study all thirteen 
case study employers used opt-outs, but nine of them had recently introduced 
changes in working practices. In some cases this amounted to the introduction 
of  flexible  working.  In  other  cases,  such  as  the  two  small  engineering 
manufacturers ME1 and ME2, there had been radical reorganisation of shift 
patterns.  
 
ME1 said it had been through ‘a massive change process with changing working 
practices accompanied by job losses’. The company previously worked a day   15
shift and a night shift four days per week, ‘which allowed everyone to work 
overtime on Friday and Saturday.’ The company had now moved to ‘double-day 
shifting of 6 a.m. – 2 p.m. and 2 p.m. – 10 p.m., working five days a week.’ 
ME2 used to run a day shift of 8 a.m.- 4.15 p.m. and a night shift of 8 p.m. – 8 
a.m. for four nights per week. The company now operates alternating day shifts 
of one week 6 a.m. – 2.15 p.m. and the following week of 2 p.m. - 10.15 p.m. 
There is also a fixed night shift of 10 p.m. – 6.15 a.m. Both companies stressed 
that the changes were not driven by the Working Time Regulations. ME1 had 
been taken over by a French sister company and the French management had 
introduced a more ‘continental culture’. More significantly, the company had 
suffered a 50% reduction in demand ‘due to market conditions, closures in the 
automotive industry and relocation to foreign countries’. According to ME2, 
‘the main driving force…whether there was a Working Time Directive or not, 
was that [the previous shift pattern] was not operationally economic for us. So, 
by our own process of change we changed it to three shifts’. Both companies 
believed it was necessary to retain the individual opt-out. 
 
Moreover, other evidence indicated it was not so much the opt-out as structural 
and cultural barriers that have stymied the re-organisation of working hours to 
comply  with  the  48-hour  limit.  Employers  in  health,  engineering  and 
construction told us that it was necessary to exceed the 48-hour limit because of 
labour/skills  shortages.  Furthermore,  the  TUC  believed  that  removing  the 
individual opt-out would have little impact in the case of white-collar workers 
‘because  you  are  talking  about  ingrained  overtime  cultures  that  are  not pay 
driven’. 
 
The  evidence  for  and  against  the  continued  use  of  opt-outs  on  business 
efficiency grounds was therefore inconclusive. However, it was clear that some 
employers use opt-outs for pragmatic reasons. 
 
4.4  Pragmatic reasons for using individual opt-outs 
 
Employers’ organisations told us that individual opt-outs are the ‘only simple, 
straightforward bit of the legislation’;
31 as such they are used to ameliorate what 
is seen to be the undue complexity of WTR. The UK practice of copying out 
European Directives with only minor textual amendments was largely blamed 
for this. The EEF commented: ‘if you have something incomprehensible you are 
copying  out,  like  the  definition  of  working  time,  [the  practice  of  copy-out] 
passes the burden of understanding the terms of the law to business, to the 
employer’.   
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Employers  told  us  that  one  source  of  confusion  was  the  concept  of 
‘unmeasured’ working time in Regulation 20. Table 3 illustrates how most case 
study employers preferred using opt-outs rather than relying on Regulation 20. 
Most  employers  said  it  was  less  risky  and  administratively  easier  to  issue 
individual opt-outs, even in circumstances where they might have been able to 
rely on other provisions of the regulations. 
 
At the same time, there were indications in several interviews suggesting that 
employers  of  ‘white-collar’  employees  would  rely  more  heavily  on  the 
Regulation 20 derogation for ‘autonomous workers’ if the opt-out were to be 
removed.  This  route  is  potentially  easier  for  employers  given  that  the  UK 
Government broadened the scope of the Regulation 20 derogation in 1999 (see 
section 2.1). As one of the union interviewees put it to us, ‘even if we get rid of 
the  opt-out  there  are  a  lot  of  white-collar  workers  who  effectively  are  not 
covered by the 48-hour limit because of those amendments’.
32 This suggests 
that  removing  the  opt-out  will  not  guarantee  greater  protection  of  workers’ 
rights in all circumstances. 
 
Employers  also  used  opt-outs  to  minimise  the  costs  of  record  keeping  and 
monitoring.  Given  the  general  obligation  to  keep  records  in  order  to 
demonstrate compliance with WTR, there is an implicit obligation to record the 
hours of those workers approaching the 48-hour limit that have not opted out. 
However, following the 1999 amendment to the WTR, employers only have to 
keep  a  record  of  the  names  of  those  individuals  that  have  signed  opt-out 
agreements and are no longer required to record the hours worked by those 
workers who have opted out. According to the HSE Working Time Officer we 
interviewed,  the  desire  to  avoid  having  to  record  hours  has  ‘meant  that 
occasionally  the  pressure  has  been  put  on  from  the  employer  to  persuade 
workers to sign opt-outs’. Moreover, several case study employers told us that if 
the opt-out were removed it would, for example, ‘really increase our record 
keeping activity, which is not something we would want to do, as it does not 
add value to anybody’.
33 
 
Employers’ organisations also argued that using opt-outs reduced the likelihood 
of  industrial  disputes  over  the  interpretation  of  WTR.  Both  employers  and 
unions  pointed  out  that  ‘the  definition  of  working  time  [can  be  a]  most 
contentious issue.’
34 So, ‘many employers have got individuals to sign opt-outs, 
not because they want them to work consistently long hours, but just to avoid 
the issue arising, because they do not wish to spend time in fruitless debate.’
35 
Using opt-outs provides flexibility, especially in situations where not all of the 
time booked as working time for pay purposes is spent working. For example, 
the  firm  of  service  engineers  said  they  allowed  their  engineers  to  book  as   17
working  time  periods they  may  have spent having  a sleep in the van  while 
waiting  for  parts  to  arrive  on  site.  Employers  said  that  a  stricter  limit  on 
working time would require a stricter definition of what constituted working 
time and also more invasive monitoring, and that this could lead to disputes. 
 
Table 3.  Impact of Regulation 20 
 
Case Studies  Regulation 20 
 
Health 
H1  Reg. 20 applied to all management. Auditors found flexible approach to 
individuals managing their own time rather than evidence of a long-hours 
culture. 
H2  Reg. 20 applied to all management. It was acknowledged that managers, 
although self-directed, have to do long hours to complete the job. There 
was  awareness  of  the  health  and  safety  implications  of  long  hours  for 
managers. 
Manufacturing / Engineering 
ME1  Only  General  Manager  seen  as  exempt  under  Reg.  20.  Everyone  else 
offered individul opt-outs. 
ME2   No  reliance  on  Reg.  20.  Easier  to  offer  all  managers  opt-outs  for 
administration purposes. 
ME3  Reliance to ‘some extent’ for staff professionals and managers. They are 
often  able  to  determine  their  own  workload  in  accordance  with 
peaks/troughs of site-work, current/future workload & client demands. 
ME4  No reliance on Reg. 20. Opt-outs administratively more efficient. Service 
engineers  seen  as  ‘independent  agents’  but  not  within  definition  of 
‘autonomous workers’. 
ME5  About  30  General  Managers  at  director  level,  the  top  1%  in  the 
organisation, regarded as coming under the definition of ‘unmeasurable 
work’.  
ME6  Middle managers and above, i.e. those above the £30,000 salary bracket, 
deemed to be self-directed and so outside the regulations, roughly about 
12% of staff. Company had had a ‘huge debate’ as to where to draw the 
line and was still uncertain. 
Financial / Legal 
FL1  Even senior employees opted out individually as the employer preferred 
not to rely on Reg. 20. It was not convinced that other managers fell under 
Reg, 20, although aware that firms in sector have relied on it. 
FL2  Looked at Reg. 20 but it was not seen as relevant.  Opt-outs seen as easier 
to administer. 
FL3  No reliance on Reg. 20. Using opt-outs allows individuals personal choice. 
Hotel / Catering 
HC1  Not convinced Reg. 20 covers managers. Opt-outs much safer approach. 
HC2  Respondent not sure how far Reg. 20 had been considered but felt some 
managers would fall under that category. 
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4.5  Industrial relations considerations 
 
As  Table  4  illustrates,  only  four  case  study  employers  had  used  either  a 
collective or workforce agreement to extend the reference period beyond the 
default of 17 weeks.  
 







Extent of Collective / Workforce Agreements 
 
Health 
H1  17 weeks  Negotiated with unions about implementing WTR. National 
level union opposed to changing reference periods at local 
level. 
H2  6 months  Negotiating collective agreements to implement WTR. 
6-month reference period allows for winter pressures / 
summer accidents. 
Manuacturing / Engineering 
ME1  17 weeks  Heavily unionised. Separate agreement on WTR outside 
collective agreement covering wage negotiation.   Saw no 
benefit in changing default reference period. 
ME2  17 weeks  Not unionised. Works committee communicates with 
workforce. Saw no need for changing default reference 
period. 
ME3  26 weeks  Local agreement with TGWU. 26-week reference period 
agreed to allow for fluctuations of site work. 
ME4  17 weeks  Service engineers not unionised. They would exceed limit 
regardless of reference period. 
ME5  12 months 
fixed 
Collective agreement negotiated with committee representing 
all employees.  Extended reference period accommodates 
cyclical fluctuations in car sales.  
ME6  12 months  Each operating company has local level collective 
agreements with the recognised union. Allows for cyclical 
fluctuations.  
Financial / Legal 
FL1  17 weeks  Not unionised. WTR have never been raised at staff 
committee. 
FL2  17 weeks  Do not recognise a union and have no collective agreements. 
FL3  17 weeks  Not unionised. No collective agreements 
Hotel / Catering 
HC1  17 weeks  No collective agreements. Very low union representation. 
HC2  17 weeks  No union recognition. No workforce agreements 
 
A major problem with using collective agreements to vary the reference period 
is that in many UK workplaces the infrastructure for collective bargaining does 
not exist. Figures from the 2002 Labour Force Survey reveal that only 29.1% of   19
employees in the UK were union members and only 48% of employees were in 
a workplace where trade union members were present. Moreover, the pay of 
only 36% of UK employees was affected by collective agreement, and in the 
private sector collective bargaining coverage was only 22%.
36 In contrast, in 
most  other  EU  Member  States  70%  or  more  of  employees  are  covered  by 
collective agreements, multi-employer bargaining prevails and there are legal 
mechanisms for the extension of the terms of collective agreements.
37 In the 
UK,  single  employer  bargaining  prevails  and  there  are  no  mechanisms 
supporting sectoral collective agreements along continental European lines. For 
the non-unionised employers in our sample, this was one reason for choosing 
the route of the individual opt-out. 
 
Furthermore, although workforce agreements (see section 2) potentially provide 
an alternative flexibility to the individual opt-out in non-unionised workplaces, 
the evidence suggests that they have been rarely used. An Institute of Personnel 
and Development Survey in 1999 suggested that only 18% of employers had 
introduced  or  were  thinking  of  introducing  one.
38  None  of  the  case  study 
employers  in  our  sample  had  considered  a  workforce  agreement  and  their 
incidence across the UK would seem to be extremely limited. Three of twenty 
case  study  organisations  in  the  Neathey  and  Arrowsmith  study,  referred  to 
above, had used a workforce agreement. Two of these organisations had long 
established  procedures  for  negotiating  with  in-house  staff  associations  as 
opposed  to  an  independent  trade  union.
39  It  is  known  that  one  workforce 
agreement  has  been  the  subject  of  an  Employment  Tribunal  case,
40  and  the 
Engineering  Employers’  Federation  told  us  that  one  of  their  members  had 
introduced one. The employment law practitioner we spoke to had drafted two 
workforce agreements, one for a weather and disaster forecasting company and 
the other for an airfreight company. Both companies had complex 24-hour shift 
patterns and the workforce agreement was used to cover the whole ambit of 
working  time  limits  and  entitlements,  with  night-working  a  particularly 
important issue, rather than just the 48-hour limit.  
 
Two reasons were put to us in our interviews to explain the limited use of 
workforce agreements. The first was the complexity of the procedure.  The EEF 
told  us  that  they  had  drafted  a  workforce  agreement  for  a  firm  of  service 
engineers, but that the firm had been so daunted by the procedure they decided 
to issue individual opt-outs instead. The second reason was that the workforce 
agreement route is ‘counter-cultural’ to the practice of UK industrial relations. 
The legal practitioner believed that none of the employers he dealt with would 
have the institutions in place to create a workforce agreement. This view is 
supported  to  some  extent  by  evidence  from  the  most  recent  Workplace 
Employment  Relations  Survey  (WERS),  which  suggests  that  only  20%  of   20
workplaces with fewer than 100 employees and only 43% of workplaces with 
100-999  employees  operated  some  kind  of  ‘joint  consultative  committee’.
41 
Moreover, even if the structures were in place, the legal practitioner believed 
employers ‘would not want to be seen to be negotiating with the workforce 
about these sorts of issues… which are classic collective bargaining issues’.  
The CBI also suggested that staff representatives on consultative committees 
would  not  want  to  step  into  the  shoes  of  an  absent  trade  union  and  start 
negotiating terms and conditions.
42  
 
4.6  The process of agreeing individual opt-outs 
 
Table 5 provides a summary of the means by which opt-out agreements were 
obtained by employers from new employees. In general, opt-out forms were 
presented to employees for signature at the time of their induction, when they 
were completing other administrative documentation. Occasionally, the opt-out 
was presented as a standard contract term that employees would have to take 
positive steps to avoid. This was the case with investment bank FL2. The legal 
practitioner informed us that the opt-out was a standard term in about half of the 
contractual packages he drafted. This kind of practice raises the question of how 
employees come under pressure, direct or indirect, to agree to opt-outs. 
 
Table 5.  Processes for obtaining opt-outs from new employees 
 
Case Studies  Process 
 
Health 
H1  Not offered to new staff. Opt-outs only offered to staff as they move 
into  a  work  pattern,  such  as  on-call  working,  which  will  entail 
working in excess of 48 hours.  
H2  Individual opt-out has not been implemented yet, although 15% of 
staff work in excess of 48 hours. 
Manufacturing / Engineering 
ME1  Form included with other personnel forms that have to be signed at 
induction. 
ME2  Opt-out form is part of induction pack.  At induction all employees are 
given the note, given time to read it, they are given the opportunity to 
discuss what it means to them and what it means for the company and 
they decide whether or not to opt out. 
ME3  New starter packs contain brief guide to WTD and an opt-out form if 
employees wish to complete it.  
ME4  ‘An employee turns up and we give them an opt-out agreement to 
sign.  It  goes  out  as  a  separate  form  but  it  goes  in  the  pack  of 
documents that form the contract at the end of the day. It is totally 
voluntary of course, if the employee does not wish to sign it then he is 
not pressurised to do so.’ 
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Table 5.  Processes for obtaining opt-outs from new employees (continued) 
 
ME5  Opt-outs not offered to new employees.  
ME6  ‘As  part  of  the  induction  they  are  told  what  is  in  the  collective 
agreement concerning the 12-month reference period. They are then 
given a choice of two forms depending on whether they want to opt in 
or  out. Where  people  are  opted  in and  want  to  be  covered  by  the 
legislation  they  are  given  specially  adjusted  shift  patterns  and  our 
personnel system monitors their hours.’ 
Financial / Legal 
FL1  ‘In our recruitment process and in the launch process we send out opt 
out forms. When someone has accepted a role with the firm then they 
receive a detailed offer pack, within which is the employee handbook, 
which explains the working time regulations under a section called 
hours of work. The opt-out form is also in that pack.’ 
FL2  ‘Everybody has opted-out. It is a standard term of our contracts now 
for everybody that’s here and for new people that start. They agree to 
disapply Regulation 4(1). It’s in both the contract and the handbook.’ 
FL3  Information about implications of the working time regulations and 
the opt-out are provided at recruitment presentations. Letter is sent out 
in general pack of offer documents. It is also discussed at induction. 
Hotel / Catering 
HC1  ‘We send them a form with a description of the legislation and what 
the  opt-out  means  to  them  and  they  are  asked  to  sign  the  opt-out 
agreement to say they are willing to work on average over 48 hours if 
need be. We have it as a separate document; it is not part of their 
contract.’ 
HC2  At  induction  a  pack  is  given  out  containing  a  standard  pro  forma 
summarising and explaining the regulations and opt-out form. 
 
Some  respondents  reported  that  pressure  was  being  brought  to  bear  on 
employees.  The  TUC  had  anecdotal  evidence  both  ‘from  unions  and  from 
members of the public saying that there is pressure put on people to opt out’ and 
the GMB believed that this practice was widespread in the construction sector. 
The experience of the HSE Working Time Officer was that ‘there had been 
examples where there has been pressure’ but this was ‘not a general practice’. 
UNISON suggested that there was ‘some moral pressure’ in hospitals and the 
HR  Director  of  one  hospital  trust  largely  confirmed  this  view:  ‘a  lot  of 
[operating theatre staff] would say “I would like to work fewer hours but I do 
not want to leave my colleagues in it and I feel obliged to do it”’. The practice 
of the international law  firm could also be seen  as  amounting to  a  form  of 
indirect influence. The firm highlighted the widespread practice of long hours 
working  and  the  availability  of  the  opt-out  at  recruitment  presentations,  in 
documents sent out when a position was offered, and upon induction.  
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On the other hand, there was evidence suggesting that employees freely sign 
opt-outs believing that it is in their own interests to do so. ACAS indicated that 
in its experience agreements were predominantly entered into voluntarily. The 
legal practitioner suggested this was because ‘no one wants to fetter themselves 
by having these limits… primarily because people want to have the individual 
freedom to earn overtime’.  Moreover, several of the trade unions accepted that 
the  freedom  to  work  overtime  rather  than  employer  pressure  was the  major 
incentive for workers to sign opt-outs. Significantly, this is not just the case for 
low  paid  workers.  For  example,  the  service  engineers  earned  approximately 
£50,000 per annum, a third of which is overtime, and AMICUS provided the 
example of semi-skilled workers in the tobacco industry where ‘if they applied 
the Working Time Directive they would lose £500 per week’. 
 
Several trade unions and the TUC also acknowledged that the willingness of 
their members to work longer hours in order to enhance their earnings created a 
‘rhetoric-reality  gap’
43  for  the  union  movement.  Their  official  position  is  to 
campaign for an end to the opt-out but then they ‘find it very hard to say to their 
members, ‘we are going to be taking money out of your pockets’.
44 ACAS also 
referred to the dichotomy in the position of trade unions and the fact that ‘some 
[ACAS] operational staff have witnessed tensions between the official position 
of some trade unions and their members on the issue of working hours.’  
 
In other cases, opting out of the 48-hour limit is not pay driven but is motivated 
more by a sense of the need to preserve individual autonomy. Flexibility and the 
ability  to  manage  one’s  own  time  is  seen  as  a  crucial  aspect  of  many 
management and professional roles. Employers in the finance and law sector 
and hotel and catering sector suggested that, for many employees, work is an 
important and rewarding part of their life and that some individuals are ‘driven 
by results, getting the work done and delivering.’
45 It was further argued that 
limiting the working hours of some individuals so that they could not do their 




5.  Assessment  
 
At  the time  of the implementation of the  Working  Time  Directive  in 1998, 
legislation in this area was expected to bring benefits to the UK economy in 
terms of enhanced productivity and innovation, in addition to meeting the more 
traditional social policy  objectives  of health  and  safety  protection  (the  legal 
justification for the Directive) and a better balance between work and family 
life.
46  More  recently,  however,  the  government’s  view,  as  expressed  by  the   23
Chancellor of the Exchequer in his 2003 Budget Statement, has been that ‘in 
striking the balance between dynamism and social standards, our position is that 
no change to European regulations, like the working time directive, should risk 
British job creation’.
47 The clear implication is that the derogations contained in 
the Directive are an important element in ensuring that the British labour market 
remains  more  ‘flexible’  than  its  continental  European  counterpart.  More 
generally,  the  British  model  of  labour  market  regulation  is  one  which  the 
government commends to its EU partners: ‘flexibility at a UK level should be 
matched by flexibility in Europe’.
48 
 
In  the  Chancellor’s  Budget  Statement,  the  term  ‘flexibility’  appears  to  be  a 
synonym for ‘freedom from external constraint’, the constraint, that is, of legal 
regulation.  Working  time  legislation  is  therefore  perceived  to  represent,  in 
microcosm, the difference between the lightly regulated UK labour market, and 
the apparently more intensive regulation of the continental systems. Our case 
studies show that this is a perspective shared not just by some employers but 
also by some workers and their representatives. Employers see the individual 
opt-out  as  necessary  if  they  are  to  meet  customer  demands  or  client 
requirements that presuppose long working hours. Employees, likewise, accept 
a long-hours culture, which is bound up with access to higher earnings and, in 
some  cases,  a  feeling  of  individual  autonomy  and  control  over  working 
arrangements.  
 
From another point of view, however, the current UK working time régime is 
rigid  and  inefficient.  As  our  case  studies  show  (see  section  4.3),  there  is  a 
perception  on  the  part  of  all  the  relevant  actors  –  employers  and  their 
associations, unions, and public bodies – that, under certain circumstances, a 
long-hours culture may lead to high rates of sickness and absenteeism and lower 
productivity (in the sense of firms producing the same level of output for a 
higher level of labour inputs). Reductions in working hours can avoid some of 
these costs while also paving the way for the simplification of working time 
systems. This pattern has been followed in a number of continental European 
systems since the implementation of major working time reductions in the mid-
1980s.
49 These reductions were accompanied by moves towards annualisation 
of  hours,  which  created  the  conditions  for  mutual  gains  on  the  part  of 
management  and  labour.  The  longer  the  reference  period,  the  greater  the 
flexibility available to management in terms of varying labour inputs to meet 
fluctuations  in  demand.  Savings  can  also  be  made  from  the  abolition  of 
overtime payment systems, which are complex to administer (although it must 
also be  noted that  annualisation  may  give  rise to administrative  costs  of its 
own).  Employees  benefit  from  the  reduction  in  overall  hours,  across  the 
reference period  as a  whole, which is generally  seen  as  a quid pro quo  for   24
annualisation.  Reduced  hours,  in  turn,  have  positive  knock-on  effects  for 
employers in terms of lower rates of absenteeism and sickness.
50  
 
If there are mutual advantages to be gained from a dual strategy of annualisation 
and  reduction  of  working  time,  why  do  we not  see  it being taken up  more 
frequently  in  the  UK?  As  we  have  seen,  some  or  all  of  the  features  just 
described are present in those workplaces in our study (in particular ME1, ME2 
and ME5), which have recently altered their working time systems. In each 
case, these changes were not solely attributable to a need to comply with the 
Directive. They appear to have been stimulated by other external factors, such 
as  a  shift  in  customer  demand  which  prompted  workforce  reorganization 
(ME1), or the influence of an overseas sister or parent company  (ME2 and 
ME5).  Organisational  change  which  goes  against  deeply-embedded  and 
mutually-reinforcing expectations often requires a catalyst of this sort. For this 
reason, we should be cautious about accepting the claim that the existing UK 
practice  should  be  preserved  simply  because  it  reflects  the  preferences  of 
employers and employees alike for a long-hours culture.  
 
This is not a new debate. The Fawley productivity agreements that were the 
subject  of  Allan  Flanders’s  classic  industrial  relations  study,  published  in 
1964,
51 were aimed, among other things, at cutting overtime working. During 
this  period,  overtime  was  regarded  as  a  wasteful  practice  which  led  to  the 
under-utilisation of labour: ‘systematic overtime means not hard working, but 
the working of unnecessarily long hours in order that a basic wage rate shall be 
supplemented by the payment of overtime premia to make up an acceptable 
wage packet’.
52 Flanders found that while overtime could be ‘the best or only 
way of coping with temporary or seasonal upsurges in labour requirements’,
53 
its ‘indiscriminate’ and ‘habitual’ use engendered expectations on the part of 
workers  which  made  it  difficult  for  management  to  curtail  it  when  the 
immediate need had passed. In the absence of effective legal constraints on 
working hours, overtime ‘has become a flourishing institution embedded in the 
special circumstances of individual firms and factories’.
54 Forty years later, the 
concern is no longer that overtime results in under-employment; rather, now 
that  long  hours  are  now  combined  with  a  high  degree  of  intensification  of 
work,
55  the implications  for health  and  safety  and  work-life  balance  are the 
focus  of  attention.  But  in  all  other  respects  it  is  sobering  to  find  Flanders’ 
conclusions  on  the  durability  of  a  long-hours  culture  in  British  industry  so 
faithfully replicated in today’s experience.  
 
There seems little doubt that a complete ban on long-hours working would be 
unfeasible in many firms and sectors. At the same time, the way in which the 
individual  opt-out  has  been  implemented  reduces  the  pressure  on  both   25
employers and unions to negotiate towards meaningful working time reductions.  
So one conclusion to draw from our study is that as long as the individual 
opt-out continues in place, a much needed stimulus for the modernisation of 
working  time,  which  could  have  come  from  the  Directive,  will  fail  to 
materialise. But to focus solely on the individual opt-out would be to miss the 
wider picture. The simple removal of the opt-out, without more, would almost 
certainly not have the desired effect of encouraging collective solutions to the 
working time issue to emerge.   
 
This  is  because,  firstly,  the  UK  lacks  the  infrastructure  of  employee 
representation that allows the continental systems to achieve flexibility in the 
application of working time standards. Collective bargaining is present in only a 
minority  of  UK  workplaces  and  there  is  little  evidence  so  far  of  workforce 
agreements filling the gap in non-unionised establishments. Informal enterprise 
committees  and  works  councils  are  becoming  more  common,  but  neither 
employers nor employees see them as having as a significant role to play in 
negotiating terms and conditions of employment. In addition, many employers 
feel  that  the  individual  opt-out  is  necessary  not  so  much  to  get  round  the 
48-hour limit as to avoid the complexity and record keeping requirements of the 
Regulations. This suggests that there needs to be a more general review and 
simplification of the existing legislation for removal of the opt-out to be an 
option. A further factor to consider is the likelihood that, in the event of the 
removal of the individual opt-out, employers would shift their attention to the 
derogation for ‘unmeasured’ working time. This would have the perverse effect 
of undermining the contractual definition of working time, while doing nothing 
to add to statutory protection. Indeed, it would exclude other protections, in 
particular those relating to daily and weekly rest periods, which do not apply to 
workers under Regulation 20. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
The evidence presented in this article suggests that the Working Time Directive 
has  yet  to  have  a  significant  impact  on  employment  relations  in  the  UK.  
Although, across the economy as a whole, surveys report a small reduction in 
hours worked by full-time male workers since 1998, the implementation of the 
Directive  has  not  led  to  widespread  changes  in  the  way  working  time  is 
organized. In particular, it has not been a catalyst for organizational reforms 
aimed at using a reduction in the length of the working week to bring about 
productivity improvements. Employers and employees alike remain wedded to a 
long-hours culture. In the case of industrial workers this is based on substantial 
reliance on overtime to boost earnings; for professionals, it is often seen as a   26
necessary  part  of  maintaining  client  loyalty,  meeting  the  expectations  of 
superiors and peers in the organization, and maintaining individual autonomy 
over the organization of working time.  
 
The individual opt-out is the principal means by which the potential impact of 
the Directive has been diluted. The opt-out provides employers with a low-cost 
mechanism  to  avoid  the  48-hour  limit,  and  the  ease  with  which  it  can  be 
deployed is one of the reasons for the limited use by employers of the collective 
derogations. These are complex to arrange, in particular for employers who, in 
the absence of a recognized trade union, only have available the route of a 
workforce agreement. In addition they provide a less complete exemption than 
that offered by the individual opt-out, since they take the form (principally) of 
an extension of the reference period for calculating the 48-hour week from 17 
weeks to one year.   
 
The  Member  States  of  the  EU,  acting  through  the  Council,  are  required  to 
review the individual opt-out on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the 
Directive’s adoption in November 2003, and to that end the Commission is 
currently undertaking a review of its effects. The preservation of the opt-out is 
seen  by  its  supporters,  including  the  UK  government,  as  contributing  to 
much-needed labour flexibility. It might be more to the point to say that the 
opt-out  allows  for  one  form  of  flexibility  –  autonomy  from  the  external 
constraints imposed by regulation – at the cost of sacrificing another, namely 
the kind of flexibility in the use and deployment of labour which could flow 
from the modernization of working time arrangements. However, it should also 
be  recognized  that  the  individual  opt-not  is  not  the  only  obstacle  to 
modernization.  Because  the  UK  lacks  effective  mechanisms  of  employee 
representation, it does not have the means needed to implement the continental 
European model of the annualisation and reduction of working time. Moreover, 
the Directive itself contains other derogations – in particular the exception for 
unmeasured working time – which would to some degree duplicate the effect of 
the individual opt-out were it to be removed. The fate of the opt-out may not 
warrant the hopes and fears that have been invested in it. 
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Notes 
 
1     Fairness at Work, Cmnd. 3968 (1998), at para. 5.6. 
 
2    At the time the final draft of this paper was written (early September 
2003), the Commission had yet to complete and publish its review. 
 
3    On the 1998 Regulations, see Barnard, 1999.   
 
4    On the 1999 Regulations, see Barnard, 2000.  
 
5    The original DTI guidance notes explained (para.2.2.2) that, essentially, 
the derogation  applied to  workers  who  had complete  control over  the 
hours they worked and whose time was not monitored or determined by 
their  employer.  Such  a  situation  might  occur,  it  was  suggested,  if  a 
worker could decide when the work was to be done, or could adjust the 
time worked as they saw fit. 
 
6    In O’Keefe v. Wolfenden, Case Number 2700214/02 the majority in the 
ET found that the head chef in a pub fell within this derogation: he was 
‘master in his own workplace’; cf. Steward v. Martin Retail Group, Case 
Number 2407135/99, para.11 where the 20 year old acting manager of a 
shop  was  not  found  to  fall  within  Regulation  20;  nor  was  a  woman 
working  as  a  sales  rep  for  a  company  selling  paper,  in  Compton  v. 
St.Regis Paper Company, Case Number 1201178/99 & 1202171/99. 
 
7    Case  C-383/92  [1994]  ECR  I-2479.  The  Court  reached  similar 
conclusions in Case C-382/93 Commission v UK in respect of Directive 
77/187/EEC on transfers of undertakings (now Directive 2001/23). 
 
8     A workforce agreement may not be made with any part of the relevant 
workforce  that  is  covered  by  a  collective  agreement  between  the 
employer and an independent trade union: WTR 1998, Sch. 1, para. 2; see 
Deakin and Morris, 2001: 308.  
 
9    See Deakin, 1990.  
 
10   Wareing, 1992. 
 
11    Marsh (1991). 
 
12    Rubery et al., 1994.   28
 
13    TUC (2002).  See also the evidence of long-hours working reported in 
DTI (2002). 
 
14    Hicks, (2002). 
 
15     Similar evidence of long hours working and the absence of overtime pay 
in many sectors was found in research carried out for the DfEE by the 
Institute  of  Employment  Research,  University  of  Warwick  and  IFF 
Employment Research (2002).   
 
16    Neathey and Arrowsmith (2001). Evidence on employers’ attitudes is also 
provided  by  two  reports  from  the  Chartered  Institute  of  Personnel 
Development (1999, 2002). 
 
17     This is reported in Appendix 2 of Neathey and Arrowsmith (2001). 
 
18    Op. cit., at p. 87. 
 
19    Op. cit, at p. 72. 
 
20     Neathey (2003). 
 
21     Ibid., at p. 16. 
 
22    Ibid., at pp. 16-18. 
 
23   The  officers  represented  the  following  trade  unions:  AMICUS, 
Association  of  University  Teachers  (AUT),  General  Municipal  and 
Boilermakers’  Union  (GMB),  National  Union  of  Teachers  (NUT), 
National Association of Schoolmasters and Union for Women Teachers 
(NASUWT),  National  Association  of  Teachers  in  Further  and  Higher 
Education (NATFHE), Transport & General Workers Union (TGWU), 
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24   These  were:  Confederation  of  British  Industry  (CBI),  Institute  of 
Directors  (IOD),  Chartered  Institute  of  Personnel  and  Development 
(CIPD),  Association  of  Colleges  (AOC),  Engineering  Employers’ 
Federation (EEF), Local Government Employers’ Association (LGEA), 
and London Investment Banking Association (LIBA). The Department of 
Health,  The  Law  Society,  the  Universities  and  Colleges  Employers’ 
Association were contacted for their views but were not interviewed. 
 
25   The School Teachers Pay and Conditions Act 1991 requires teachers to 
be available to carry out duties at the direction of the Head Teacher for 
1265 hours over a reference period of 195 days. So directed working time 
falls within the 48-hour limit averaged over the 17-week reference period 
set out in the WTR.  
 
26   Interview with Association of University Teachers (AUT). 
 
27   One of the hotel companies did say that they used opt-outs for seasonal 
temporary staff covering Christmas and Summer. 
 
28   Interview with Investment Bank FL2. 
 
29   Interview with TUC. 
 
30   Neathey and Arrowsmith (2001), at p. 11.  
 
31   Interview with Engineering Employers’ Federation. 
 
32   Interview with GMB union. 
 
33   Interview with Employer HC2 (Hotel and Catering).  
 
34   Interview with AMICUS. 
 
35   Interview with Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development. 
 
36   DTI  (2002)  Trade  Union  Membership:  an  analysis  of  data  from  the 
Autumn  2001  Labour  Force  Survey,  available  at 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/er/emar/artic_01.pdf  
73% of public sector employees are covered by Collective Agreements. 
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37   European Industrial Relations Observatory (2002) Collective bargaining 
coverage and extension procedures, available at: 
http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2002/12/study/TN0112102S.html 
 
38   Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (1999). 
 
39   Neathey and Arrowsmith (2001), pp. 15-16. 
 
40   Watson v Swallow Hotels Case 6402399/99, Carlisle Industrial Tribunal. 
 
41   See DTI, 2002b. 
 
42   Evidence from WERS suggests that where there were ‘joint consultative 
committees’ in place, only 50% dealt with pay issues, whereas working 
practices  (88%)  and  health  and  safety  (86%)  were  the  most  common 
issues dealt with. 
 
43   Interview with TUC. 
 
44   Ibid. 
 
45   Interview with International law Firm.  
 
46    See Barnard (1999), op. cit.  
 
47    Hansard,  House  of  Commons,  9  April  2003,  The  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchequer, Gordon Brown MP, Budget Statement, at col. 277. 
 
48    Ibid. 
 
49     See the essays collected in Bosch (1994). 
 
50     See our discussion of case ME6 in section 4.3, highlighting the potential 
costs, in terms of employee sickness, of long-hours working. 
 
51    Flanders (1964). We are grateful to Willy Brown for pointing out the 
relevance of Flanders’ study for our present analysis. 
 
52     Foreword by Aubrey Jones, the then Chairman of the National Board of 
Prices and Incomes, in Flanders (1964), at p. 9. 
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53     Flanders (1964), at p. 227. 
 
54     Ibid, at p. 228. 
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